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SETTING FORTH THE PROBLEM

Starting from Ouro Preto's Protocol (O.P.P.) it is certain that
Mercosur has international legal subjectivity,' becoming in this respect an
intergovernmental organization with international legal subjectivity. In
achievement of their quest, which is that of consolidating a common
market and a free trade union among its members and possibly the
associated States, 2 the O.P.P. endowed the Mercosur with diverse organs
which are as follows: a) The Council of the Common Market; b) The
Common Market Group; c) The Commission of the Trade of Mercosur; d)
The Combined Parliamentary Commission; e) The Socio-Economic
Advisory Forum; and f) The Administrative Secretary of the Mercosur. 3
Of the organs mentioned, the first three have decisive capacity4 and their
formal expressions of will, called respectively Decisions, Resolutions, and
Directives, which are obligatory for the States,, thereby becoming a legal
right encompassing the States. This work seeks to analyze the validity and
obligation for country members of the constituent norms of the Mercosur
system, to elucidate if they conform a plexus of International Public Right
or of Community Right; the necessity or not of previous internalization of
the emanated dispositions of its organs whose execution is reputed as
obligatory for the States regarding its application in the domestic
environment of each one of them; and finally, the legal nature of that
normative or law, everything by the light of the rules of the International
Public Right that is applicable and, insofar as possible, to those of the
internal right of its member countries, especially, those of the Argentinean
Right.
II.

To WHAT LEGAL SYSTEM DOES THE MERCOSUR NORMATIVE
CORRESPOND?

It is not a Community Right,6 because none of Mercosur's
constituent instruments creates organs that are multinational. The Council
of the Common Market, the Common Market Group and the Commission
of Trade of the Mercosur, are intergovernmental organs that adopt
decisions by consensus. The rules emanated by these organs link the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 34.
See generally Treaty of Asuncion, art. 5.
Ouro Perto's Protocol art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. arts. 9, 15, & 20.
See generally HEBER ARBUET VIGNALI, LAS

RELACIONES ENTRE LA NORMATIVA DEL
MERCOSUR Y LOS SISTEMAS INTERNOS DE SUS ESTADOS MIEMBROS (1997).
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countries in the international environment, carrying the responsibility for
nonfulfilment, and possibly, according to the nature and content of the
norm that it is, it can also generate an internal right for each State
according to the dispositions of the legal system of each one of the
countries. If it were a system of Community Right it would have its own
organs which would possess attributes of multinationality with capacity of
creating norms to watch over their execution and to sanction their
offenders, becoming the obligatory decisions of the same ones for the
States, prevailing over the internal norms and the immediate and direct
execution.'
It is important to affirm here that the attribute of multinationality in
the Argentinean legal system can not be presumed or detected tacitly.
Article 75 clause 24 of the National Constitution, modified in 1994,
authorizes the national government "to approve integration treaties that
delegate competitions and jurisdiction to organizations that are
multinational in conditions of reciprocity and equality, and they respect the
democratic order and the human rights," adding that those norms have
superior hierarchy to the laws., The second section of article 75, clause 24
establishes a need for a quantified majority of the members of each house
of legislature for the approval of treaties of that nature. 9 This disposition,
that establishes taxative conditions for the recognition of the multinational
status and determines a rigorous legislative procedure before the entrance
in validity of the treaties that give life to organizations with such powers,
does not leave any place for doubts that the multinationality status is an
attribute that should be conferred formally and expressly.
The creative instruments of the Mercosur system are norms of
International Public Right, coinciding our opinion with those that think that
it constitutes a special system inside of it. For the legal system of
Mercosur, we should understand the sources mentioned by article 41 of the
O.P.P.,' ° and they are composed of Asunci6n's Treaty, their protocols or

7.

Dr. Elias Bluth, mentioned in JORGE PIREZ OTERMIN'S MERCADO COMON DEL SUR

refers to the thought of Dr. Eduardo Jim6nez of Ar6chaga in the sense that the direct application
does not constitute an exclusive and novel attribute of the community right and citing it textually
states that this "direct application to the individuals and societies of norms of conventional origin,
is admitted in the International Right and is consecrated in an advisory opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice that dates from 1923. Since then it is accepted by most of the
doctrine (except for the dualist authors) and for the international practice that the treaties can
force directly by themselves people with physical and judicial individuality, whenever the treaty
possesses the necessary concretion degree." Id. (Editorial note: translated from Spanish).
8.
ARG. CONST. art. 75, cl. 24.
9. Id.
10. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 41.
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additional or complementary instruments, the complementary agreements
taking place in their jurisdiction and their protocols and the decisions of the
Council, the resolutions of the Group and the directives of the
Commission."

Article 42, 2nd Part of the

O.P.P.,12

after pointing out that the

organs with power of decision inside the system are intergovernmental,
establishes that their obligatory decisions will be incorporated into the
national legal system by the procedures foreseen in the legislation of each
country, provided this is necessary. This demonstrates that the process of
incorporation of the Mercosur norms is that of the International Public
Right with some peculiarities that we will analyze in this work. The
uniform practice of the States that have approved incorporation according
to the procedure regulated by their own legal systems for the approval of
the treaties, the Treaty of Asunci6n, the Protocol of Brasilia and the
O.P.P., is consistent with our evaluation of the system as one based on an
International Public Right. Article 40 of the O.P.P. "I leaves very clear the
non-community nature of the right generated by the Mercosur organs,
establishing that the necessary measures to incorporate it into the internal
systems will be known by the Administrative Secretary of the organization.

III. THE FOUNDATION OF THE VALIDITY OF MERCOSUR LAWS FOR
I

THE MEMBER STATES

According to the General International Public Right to which they
are linked, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay have expressed their consent
(ratification) in being obligated by the dispositions of the Convention of
Vienna on the Right of Treaties, signed March 23, 1969, admitting the
general principle of responsibility for nonfulfillment established by article
27, with the limitation of article 46 of the same Convention.
Brazil has not ratified The Convention of Vienna on the Right of
Treaties. Yet having celebrated Asunci6n's Treaty and expressed its
consent validly in being linked by the same, Brazil can not ignore its
obligatory nature nor ignore the normative inherent in its consequence

11. We consider important to clarify in this point that in our opinion, the fundamental right
of a community and constituent system of their organs, should not be conceptualized as original
community right. We understand that this denomination is misleading because the fact that a
community system is constituted by an international treaty does not make the community system
lose its intrinsic nature as a source of international public right.
12. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 42, § 2.
13. Id. art. 40.
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without violating the principle of good faith and of non-contradiction and
without incurring international responsibility."1
According to the internal right of the States contracting, the Magna
Cartas of the four States comprising the Mercosur system recognize the
international treaties as formal sources of their own legal systems. They
are identified as follows: Constitution of Brazil article 102; Constitution of
Paraguay articles 137 clause 1 and 141; Constitution of Uruguay articles 6
and 85 clause 7; and the Constitution of Argentina article 31 and article
75, clauses 22 and 24.
However, the coincidence among the fundamental norms of the
domestic legal systems of the contracting countries of Asunci6n's Treaty
about the individualization of the treaties as a source of their own legal
right, is nevertheless not symmetrical to the constitutional laws of each one
of them regarding the hierarchical location of the treaties in relation to the
rest of the sources of the local legal order. Indeed, while the Constitutions
of Argentina and Paraguay grant prevalence to treaties over their own
national laws," the constitutions of Brazil and Uruguay do not mention
anything in this respect, thereby always leaving this point open to the
interpretation of the highest tribunals in each State, which to the present
have always exhibited an erratic jurisprudence.16
14. If an abstraction was made of the principle of good faith, the international right would
fall from its base since it constitutes the inspiring nucleus of what Kelsen denominated the
fundamental hypothetical norm, and with this reach it considers its repeated jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, among which will mention for its clarity, the one seated in the case
of Namibia, 1971 in the one that sustained on this matter: "One of the basic principles that
govern the creation and execution of judicial obligations, be it whatever source, it is the good
faith. The reciprocal trust is an inherent condition to the international cooperation, especially in
a time that cooperation is more and more indispensable." (Editorial note: translated from
Spanish). For the concrete case of Brazil it should also be noted that this State is a member of
the UN and of the OAS, and that principle results in an obligatory imposition of article 2, clause
2 and 3 (c) of the respective constituent letters of those international organizations, without
forgetting that Resolution 2625 A.G. of the UN leaves clear that the same one not only links in
relation to the obligations obtained from the letter, but to all international obligation. As for the
possibility of exempting from the execution of an international obligation foreseen by article 46
of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the right of the treaties, it is generally admitted that the
State that refutes the validity of a treaty or its norms for constitutional reasons can only invoke
those that are patent or absolutely evident for the other States, and in the same sense resolves the
question the Constitution of Argentina according to the interpretation of article 27 of their text in
that it formalizes the failure of the National Supreme Court of Justice in the case of Caft la
Virginia, which determines that the constitutional norms that have principles of public right
prevail over those of the international treaties that are in contrast.
15. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 75, § 22; art. 137, § 1.
16. See generally VIGNALI, supra note 6, in his work that we have mentioned previously,
tells us that the Uruguayan jurisprudence sustained the equality in rank between the treaty and the
law up to 1970 and during the decade of the 90's; and the supremacy of the treaty over the law
during the decade of the 70's and in some recent shortcomings. Brazil in general sustained
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IV. THE ORGANS OF MERCOSUR
A. Legal Nature
Concomitantly with what we have presented already, since
Mercosur is an intergovernmental international organization with legal
international subjectivity, we must conclude that their organs with power
of decision, the Council, the Group and the Commission of Trade, are
intergovernmental according to articles 2, 3, 4, 11, and 17 of O.P.P."7 It is
necessary to highlight in this topic that among the organs with decisive
power, the council distinguishes itself as being the organ that has the
corresponding legal representation of the whole system.18
B. Competencies
The Mercosur organs have competencies attributed to them
specifically by the O.P.P. and they are determined in what concerns the
Council by articles 3 and 8, in what it refers to the Group, by articles 10
and 14 and in what it concerns the Commission, by articles 16, 19, and
21.
C. The Legal Nature and Hierarchical Order of the Norms
Emanatedfrom the Mercosur Organs
We reiterate that we share the opinion of those that think that the
norms generated by activity of the Mercosur organs (Decisions,
Resolutions and Directives) constitute a source of Special International
Public Right, of positive nature, whose distinctive characteristic note is its
consent genesis among the representatives of the States according to the
organ from which they come. 9 In this point, we need to mention that the
contracting parties have inscribed to Asunci6n's Treaty in the ALADI as a
partial agreement number 18, ratifying the legal nature of International
Public Right of the normative of Mercosur.2
In what relates to the question of the hierarchical order among the
derived norms of the different organs, we understand that in practical
equality in rank between the treaty and the law; that is to say that the latter prevails over the
previous one, although more recently its jurisprudence sustained that the law does not abolish the
treaty but rather it only suspends its application.
17. See generally Jorge P6rez Otermin, El Mercado Comiin del Sur. Desde Asunci6n a
Ouro Preto. Aspectos Jurldico-Institucionales,DE FUNDACIN DE CULTURA UNIVERSITARIA DE
MONTEVIDEO (1995).

18. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 8, cl.3.
19. Id. art. 37.
20.

Cafes laVirginia C.J.S.N. (1992).
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terms it is difficult because of the different attributes and functions
assigned to them, and because the O.P.P. does not contain any applicable
rule in this respect, it is reasonable to argue that a degree of preference
between them exists, the Decisions, being the source of more hierarchy,
continued in second and third order by the Resolutions and Directives.
Given the quality of the political-institutional representation that each State
has in the Mersosur Council (Ministers of R. E. and of Economy) and the
functions and attributions that it assigns article 8 of the O.P.P., especially
the one of exercising the legal ownership of the system, there are no
doubts that the resulting norms of their activity occupy a higher hierarchy
among those that originate through the Organs of the Mercosur. In turn, it
is logical that the Directives have less hierarchy than the Resolutions
because the Commission is an organ in charge of assisting the Common
Market Group.,,
V.

APPLICATION OF THE GENERATED NORMS BY THE MERCOSUR

ORGANS IN THE INTERNAL LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF EACH MEMBER

STATE
According to article 42 of the O.P.P., "the emanated norms of the
organs of Mercosur foreseen in article 2 of this Protocol will have
obligatory character and, when it is necessary, they will be incorporated
into the national legal systems by means of the procedures foreseen by the
legislation of each country."2 The Decisions, Resolutions and Directives
being sources of international rights for the particular States that are part of
the system, their incorporation and applicability in the internal environment
will be in principle conditioned by the previous improvement of the
approval procedure or internalization foreseen by the classification of each
one of them. It is logical to reason that in attention to their nature and
reach, it would not be appropriate to demand for all the normative derived
from the Mercosur organs, the approval according to the domestic
procedures used to incorporate international treaties, since the traditional
legislative delays in these steps would convert a good part of the normative
into an inopportune and inadequate law. The inscription of Asunci6n's
Treaty in the framework of the ALADI partially reached agreement No. 18
demonstrates that the member States have been internationalized by
Mercosur norms because that legal framing emanates the possibility to
incorporate the right gestated by the organs of the system by acts of the

21. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 16.
22. Id. art. 42.
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Executive Powers as agreements in simplified form of execution of a treaty
that has already drawn the respective internal steps of approval.2Y
What has been exposed here, by the general principle arrived at on
this topic, sustains that the Mercosur normative should be incorporated into
the legal classification particular to each State, if it is demanded in this
way, and following the procedure for them foreseen according to the
nature and importance of the Mercosur dispositions to internalize. 1 We
believe that to incorporate into the internal right the derived norms of the
Mercosur organs in an opportune and effective way, it is a legal duty of
the member States, turning out to be as such a specific content of the
generic duty of completing a treaty in good faith, and it forces them
already as a positive right contained in article 26 of the Treaty of Vienna
on the right of the Treaties (in Argentina's, Uruguay's and Paraguay's
case), or a norm of general international right (in Brazil's case who did not
ratify the aforementioned Convention).
It seems clear that article 42 of the O.P.P., when conditioning the
duty of each state to incorporate into their own legal classification by
means of the procedures foreseen by the legislation of each country, to the
fact that it is necessary, it admits the possibility of the direct application of
these norms to the legal order particular to some of the States that allows it
this way. However, it is necessary to wonder if suppositions exist in that
the Mercosur norms that can be directly applicable without executing the
incorporation step ruled previously by the internal right of each State.
Assisting the objective and end of Asunci6n's Treaty, the necessary
consent so that the organs of the system generate norms and the obligation
the States recognize such as same, we think that this supposition of
immediate and direct application exists and that it can become from the
expressed convention to this respect regarding the representatives of the
States that are contracting, or of the factual circumstance in that they
contain at least the following requirements:
1. That the norm regulates a matter of the Mercosur organ
unequivocally with decisive capacity of which it emanates;

23. See VIGNALI, supra note 16; see also supra note 6.
24. None of the constitutions of the States provide the agreements in a simplified form.
The Jurisprudence of Argentina admitted the applicability of the agreements in simplified form of
the execution of a mark treaty in the case of Caf6 la Virginia C.J.S.N (1992) and in the
expression of the vote separated by Minister Antonio Boggiano that said: "Although the consent
of the State was shown in simplified form, without any intervention of the Congress, this took
place previously by means of the legislative approval of the Tratatado of Montevideo 1980 (law
22.354) that allows the concentration of this type of agreements." (citation omitted) (Editorial
note: translated from Spanish).
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That the norm is self-sufficient and operative, understanding
from this that all subjects are explicit and clear in what it
reaches and the content of the right or the obligation that it
consecrates; and
3. That there are no national norms preexisting that regulate the
same matter.
It is appropriate to question what would happen in the event that a
State omits to incorporate the Mercosur normative in absence of
disposition that it determines a certain term to make. It seems that this is a
topic not resolved by the O.P.P. and we think that the appropriate
conclusion should be of qualifying the behavior illegal, in common with
what was held by the Supreme Court of Argentina in the case "Ekmedjian"
C.J.S.N. (1992) in opinion 16 of the vote for the majority that textually
says "[t]he violation of an international treaty can happen so much for the
establishment of internal norms that they prescribe a behavior professedly
contrary, as much as for the omission of establishing dispositions that
make possible its execution. Both situations are contradictory with the
previous international ratification of the treaty ...."2
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT APPLICATION OF THE MERCOSUR
NORMS IN THE ARGENTINEAN LEGAL SYSTEM
The reforms introduced to the National Constitution in 1994
through the text of the new article 75, clauses 22 and 24, that grant to the
international treaties and the agreements superior hierarchy to that of the
law, seems to open the door to the possibility that the Mercosur are of
direct and immediate application in the Argentinean legal system. Indeed
when constituting the Mercosur normative regarding the Special
International Public Right of identical nature to that of the agreements of
partial reach inscribed in ALADI, it would be directly applicable for the
Argentinean judges and with primacy over the national laws according to
25. In equal sense, although saving distances, the Tribunal of the CE in the case
Francovich established that a State member can not oppose other states because of a
nonfulfilment of a directive, be it for an action or omission. It is a supposition of direct
application, since although the directive can not be invoked to demand the execution of the State
or of a third State, it can be made to claim the repair of the damages suffered by the omission of
sanctioning norms.
According to the European doctrine, the essential characteristic of the directives,
community norms of harmonization, is the existence of a certain term for their incorporation,
otherwise, they base, the State could invoke its freedom of election of the moment of execution.
Although it is certain that the granted terms give certainty and judicial security, we do not
believe that its absence grants indiscriminate liberty. The limit to liberty from incorporating the
normative of the Mercosur that arises of the juridical duty of making it, is given by the necessity
of the incorporation of the norm is opportune and effective.
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the jurisprudence sustained by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
in the case Cafe La Virginia, C.J.S.N. (1994) (appeal denied). It is
important to conclude in practice and in the Argentinean legal system, that
it would be demandable by the parties involved in the application of the
emanated norms of the Mercosur organs on behalf of the national judges,
without caring if they have or have not mediated formal acts of
incorporation to the national laws.
We consider appropriate to mention here that the primacy of the
Mercosur norms over the laws does not involve the National Constitution,
and that in the event of normative opposition, it should be proceeded to
conform to the principle settled down by article 27 of same, whose correct
interpretation takes to maintain the primacy of the constitutional norm
which is a safeguard or receipt of a principle of Public Right, a
circumstance which will always be of legal definitive value.
This
interpretation conforms with the acceptable exception to be subtracted from
the execution of an emanated international obligation of a treaty by
opposition with fundamental norms of the legal system internally foreseen
by article 46 of the Convention of Vienna on the Right of Treaties of 1969.
We think that among the principles of Public Right that are
contained in the constitutional norms, article 121 stands out (clause of
Reservation), which establishes that the States conserve all the power not
delegated by the Constitution to the Federal Government, therefore the
application of the Mercosur norms that regulate matters of exclusive
incumbency of the States, should have previously relied on the formal and
expressed adhesion to its content for a legislative State act, like it has
happened recently at times when the Federal Argentinean government has
proposed normative unification in the whole national territory of laws that
involve unequivocal stately abilities, those mentioned are the Federal
Fiscal Pact and the new National Law of Traffic that matched their validity
in the jurisdictions of states to the previous approval of local law.

